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Résumé / Abstract
Nous analysons les cause dasymétrie entre les firmes et entre les
marchés dune même industrie. Nous nous interrogeons sur le cas où une légère
asymétrie technologique présente ex ante se répercute ex post, de manière
amplifiée, sur les coûts, les parts de marché, les prix et les profits. Notre modèle,
un duopole de Cournot avec deux marchés, met en lumière les rôles respectifs
des conditions du marché, en loccurence celui de lélasticité de la demande, et
des caractéristiques des organisations, plus précisément le rôle de linertie
organisationnelle. Il est démontré que ces deux types de facteurs ont un impact
similaire, voire sont substituts, en ce qui concerne lasymétrie dans les coûts.
Linertie organisationnelle semble cependant jouer un rôle plus important que
les conditions dumarché pour lasymétrie dans les parts de marché et les profits.
Enfin, nous montrons que lasymétrie dans les coûts qui survient à léquilibre du
duopole nest pas socialement optimale : les firmes devraient se spécialiser
davantage là où elles ont un avantage technologique ex ante.
Weanalyze the sources of persistent asymmetry between firms and
between markets in a given industry. We focus on the case where some
exogenous ex ante cost asymmetry can be magnified ex post in terms of cost
(capabilities), market shares, prices and profit. Our model - a two-product
Cournot duopoly - emphasizes the respective role of market conditions
(demand elasticities) and organizational characteristics (organizational
inertia). We find that both factors act as substitutes in creating asymmetries
in cost; however, organizational factors seem to play a greater role than
market ones in explaining asymmetries in market shares and profit. We also
show that, from a benevolent social planners viewpoint, the equilibrium
asymmetry in cost that results in the duopoly is not enough : each firm should
specialize further in the market where it has an ex ante cost advantage.
Mots Clés : Duopole multi-produits, Inertie organisationnelle, Capabilités
Keywords : Multi-Product Duopoly, Organizational Inertia, Capabilities
JEL : L10, L11

1INTRODUCTION
Diversity is a prevalent characteristic of human societies. People differ in
their personality, values, tastes and features; countries in their landscape, history,
languages and cultures. Although economists do not deny the ubiquity of diversity
in social life - they actually see it as an important reason for establishing a market
system (Friedrich von Hayek, 1945), they have often predicted that such diversity
may not permeate most relevant dimensions of economic life, at least in the long
run. This is indeed a logical outcome of perfect competition. Take, for example,
the behavior of two key economic magnitudes - profits and prices - in this context:
clearly, the former would settle at zero for every firm and the latter would take a
single value for each product. Empirical research suggests, however, that
convergence on economic dimensions may not occur always, as significant
discrepancies in firms' conduct and performance have been found to persist over
time (Kenneth J. Hatten and Dan E. Schendel, 1977; John Cubbin and Paul
Geroski, 1987; Dennis C. Mueller, 1986, 1990; Ariel Pakes, 1987; and Richard
Schmalensee, 1987). In this note, we study why this might be so. Specifically, we
investigate which characteristics of an economic environment tend to magnify,
instead of smoothing out, some socially given (exogenous) asymmetry.
There is an expanding literature that seeks to explain heterogeneity within
industries. Some papers (for example Peter Zemsky [1993]) build on the previous
literature on spatial competition (for a survey of this literature, see Jean Tirole
[1988], chapter 7). Another stream - mainly a theoretical one - attributes this
phenomenon to the lack of convexity inherent in organizational design (Rabah
Amir, 1995; Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1994) or technology choice (Davis E. Mills
and William Smith, 1996). In the absence of convexity, optimizing firms
necessarily select corner-solution strategies, and these strategies may lie at different
corners of their choice set. These works address an issue that differs from ours in
one important respect: they deal with endogenous ex post asymmetry and do not
relate it to ex ante exogenous differences between firms.
A third branch of literature bases industry heterogeneity on the persistent
effects of random shocks. The possibility that contingent events affecting a given
firm make a lasting impact on its relative position (and that of others) within the
industry was pointed out early on by many economists (see e.g., Frank H. Knight
[1921]). Such marking events could include unpredictable changes in the firm's
business environment (Armen A. Alchian, 1950), as well as successful bets and
creative insights by the firm's management (Jay B. Barney, 1986). For the effects
of those events to persist over time, however, there has to be some resistance in the
business environment that prevents firms' conduct and performance to converge
rapidly. There is an ongoing debate between industrial organization and
management strategy scholars concerning the causes of this resistance (see Daniel
The similarity and independence of demand functions seems to fit the situation of an1
industry such as pharmaceuticals. Consider, for instance, two important markets of this industry: that
for cardiovascular drugs and that for cancer drugs. Those markets are about the same size and drugs in
different markets are clearly neither substitutes nor complements.
Implicit here is a strict budget constraint, so that a lower marginal cost on one market2
implies a higher marginal cost on the other market. The presence of this constraint differentiates our set-
up from a standard R&D investment game (see e.g., Morton Kamien et al. [1992]).
2
F. Spulber [1995]). The former would usually look for entry and mobility barriers
(Richard E. Caves and Michael E. Porter, 1977), which includes search and
learning costs (Boyan Jovanovic, 1982; Steve A. Lippman and Richard P. Rumelt,
1982; Arthur Fishman and Rafael Rob, 1995), whilst the latter would rather focus
on the firm's organization (see the survey in Röller and Sinclair-Desgagné [1996]).
This note provides a unifying view on the problem of industry
heterogeneity. Within some range of our model's parameters, this phenomenon can
readily be linked to the absence of convexity. In the opposite range, on which we
concentrate, we show that, under specific organizational and market conditions
slight exogenous differences in the firms' respective endowment can lead to large
ex post discrepancies in technology, profits, prices and market share. We actually
find that market and organizational conditions are substitutes in producing
technology differences. We also identify two kinds of asymmetry: firm asymmetry,
which refers to heterogeneity amongst firms competing in an industry - the standard
meaning of industry heterogeneity, and supply asymmetry, which refers to
differences between supply functions in the various markets of a multi-product
industry. We find that there would be less divergence between firms ex post - their
respective profit would be the same, for instance - if only one kind of asymmetry is
present ex ante.
Our model brings together several notions of the industrial organization
and management strategy literatures, yet it remains rather simple and intuitive. We
consider a two-market duopoly. Demand functions on each market are independent
and identical. Firms are identical ex ante, except for a parameter of their cost1
function which determines their respective marginal cost on each market. This
parameter can be seen as capturing a particular kind of what many authors (see
Alfred D. Chandler [1992]; and Richard E. Nelson [1994]) call "organizational
capabilities", i.e. the efficiency with which a firm can deliver goods on several
markets at the same time. If firms are bidivisional, for instance, it may indicate the
contribution of their central headquarters' supporting activities. Firms interact2
within a two-stage game. In the second stage, they compete à la Cournot on each
market. In the first stage, they set their actual capabilities, incurring a cost that
increases as departure from the ex ante situation becomes more drastic. In our
interpretation of the model, the curvature of the latter cost function measures the
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Note that the management strategy literature sometimes views the dual of organizational3
inertia - i.e. organizational flexibility - as part of the firm's organizational capabilities, which might create
confusion.
With this specification, industry effects due to variations in consumers' preferences are4
ruled out, so the impact of firms' conduct is emphasized.
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(1)
degree of "organizational inertia" in each firm, i.e. the amount of resistance to
change by their respective organization. Organizational inertia is a well-known and
acknowledged phenomenon (Rumelt, 1995; and David J. Teece, 1980); its role
together with that of ex ante capabilities and the slope of market demands in
enhancing ex post firm and supply asymmetries is clarified below.3
The paper runs as follows. Section I presents the model. Section II
analyzes how ex ante asymmetries can be magnified ex post under specific market
and organizational conditions. Section III takes up welfare issues associated with
firm and supply asymmetries. An important question in competition policy is
whether enduring profits of firms in a given industry are due to monopoly power or
production efficiency (see e.g., Harold Demsetz [1973]). We demonstrate in this
section that firms' profits do not increase at the expense of consumer surplus in the
absence of supply asymmetry. We also investigate the optimal levels of firm and
supply asymmetries. Section IV concludes the paper.
I. THE MODEL
We consider an industry with two markets A and B and two firms i and j.
Markets are characterized by identical and independent inverse demand functions
p = a-bQ and p = a-bQ , where p and p are the prices associated withA A B B A B
respective total quantities Q and Q , and the parameters a and b are positive.A B 4
Each firm k (= i, j) incurs total cost c(t q + (1-t )q ) for producing quantities qk k k k k
A B A
and q of goods A and B, where 0 # t # 1. For simplicity, the function c(@) isk k
B
assumed to be linear with slope equal to 1. Hence, the parameter t (resp. 1-t ) isk k
firm k's marginal cost for producing on market A (resp. B). Given the constraint on
t , we interpret this parameter as an index of firm k's organizational capabilities.k
More precisely, assuming that firm k has adopted a bidivisional structure, then tk
indicates the amount of some scarce resource (e.g., the attention of highly competent
people) that the central corporate headquarters contributes to each division.
We now analyze a two-stage game between firms i and j. In the second
stage, firms compete à la Cournot on markets A and B. That is, each firm sets its
quantities q and q in order to solvek k
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a is assumed large enough so that these quantities are positive.5
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(3)
(4)
(5)
taking the other firm's production as given. Standard Cournot calculations yield the
equilibrium quantities for each firm:5
At stage 1, firms set their respective capabilities t and t . They do not starti j
from scratch, however, but from some ex ante (i.e., socially given or "natural")
endowments which we denote by tE and t E respectively. The presence ofi j
organizational resistance or inertia entails that firm k incurs a cost ,(t - t E) , , >k k
2
0, if it chooses to modify its initial capabilities. The problem that each firm solves
at stage 1 is then given by
An interior solution to this problem for firm i must satisfy the following first-order
condition:
A similar condition holds for firm j. The second-order condition for an interior
maximum to problem (3) is b, > 8/9, and an equilibrium exists in this case
provided b,  4/3.
After substituting the derivatives in equation (4) and some manipulations,
we obtain the following reaction functions:
t
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The case where b, < 8/9 corresponds to a situation already analyzed by Mills and Smith6
(1996). In this case the objective functions at stage 1 are convex and there are two possible types of
pure-strategy equilibria: one with maximum ex post differentiation, i.e. t -t = 1 (even ifi j
t = t ), and one with no differentiation, i.e. t -t = 0.i j i j
B B
5
(6)
Note that, when b, > 8/9, these functions are downward sloping. In this case,
therefore, firms' capabilities are strategic substitutes in the sense that, if one firm
increments its capabilities towards market A, then the other firm increases its
capabilities to serve market B.
II. ASYMMETRIES
In this section we study the economic conditions that tend to magnify some
initial heterogeneity in the endowments t and t . Therefore, we concentrate on thei j
B B
case where b, > 8/9 (but  4/3), t  t , and the equilibrium values of t and ti j i j
B B
satisfy equation (4). Organizational conditions will be given by the inertia6
parameter ,, and market conditions by the demand parameter b. It will be useful
to distinguish between two meanings of asymmetry, that is
(i) firm asymmetry, which occurs when t - t  0 ; andi j
(ii) supply asymmetry, which occurs when t + t  1 .i j
The sum t + t can be interpreted as measuring industry (as opposed to firm-i j
specific) capabilities. Let us first deal with those capabilities.
A. Supply Asymmetry
Adding up the two reaction functions in (5) and rearranging yields
The next result is a trivial consequence of this equation.
PROPOSITION 1: There is ex post supply asymmetry, i.e. t + t  1, if and onlyi j
if a similar asymmetry existed ex ante, i.e. t + t  1. Moreover, if there is ani i
B B
"efficiency bias" ex ante towards market A ( resp. market B) so that t + t < 1i i
B B
(resp. > 1), then supply asymmetry is magnified ex post and we have t + t < t +i i i
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We are of course modelling a one-shot situation as opposed to a repeated one. The simplest7
way to perform the latter would be to replace t and t by t and t , and make another iteration (thisi j i j
B B
amounts to focusing on Markov strategies). Equation (6) then implies that supply symmetry, i.e. t + ti j
= 1, would always be maintained through time.
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(7)
(8)
t (resp. t + t > t + t ).i i i i i
B B B 7
It also appears that the magnitude of ex post supply asymmetry depends
on the product of market and organizational factors b,. The derivative of (6) with
respect to this product is given by
If t + t < 1, this derivative is positive; if t + t > 1, it is negative. From this andi i i i
B B B B
using the above proposition, we can make the additional statement:
PROPOSITION 2. A smaller product b, will further enhance ex post supply
asymmetry.
Note that b, will get smaller due to the joint occurrence of a more elastic demand
and a lower organizational inertia, a situation which can be viewed as being
relatively close to that of a competitive environment.
B. Firm Asymmetry
Let us first analyze asymmetry in firm-specific capabilities. Substracting
the two reactions functions in (5) and rearranging, we get
This yields the following result.
PROPOSITION 3. Firms diverge in their respective ex post capabilities, i.e. t -i
t  0, if and only if some difference in their initial endowments exists, i.e. t - t j i j
B B
0. Moreover, since *D* > 1, firm asymmetry in capabilities is magnified.
Note that, when b, > 4/3, then D > 1 and the initial biases of firms are reinforced;
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on the other hand, if b, < 4/3, then D < -1 so the firms' respective ex post
capabilities would permute with respect to their ex ante position.
The derivative of D with respect to b, is negative. Interpreting the size of
b, as indicating the amount of departure from a competitive environment, we get
the following assertion.
PROPOSITION 4. A more competitive environment brings an larger increase in
firm asymmetry if b, > 4/3, but a smaller increase if b, < 4/3.
Two remarks are relevant at this point. First, supply asymmetry has no
impact on firm asymmetry in capabilities, and vice-versa. In that sense the two
kinds of asymmetries are mutually exclusive and they deserve separate treatments.
Second, the ex post magnitude of both sorts of asymmetry depends on the
combination of market and organizational factors, but these factors are substitutes:
that is, more organizational inertia together with greater product market
competition, or greater organizational flexibility jointly with lower product market
competition, entail the same effect on industry asymmetry and firm asymmetry in
capabilities.
Let us now turn to firm asymmetry in supplied quantities and market
shares. The equilibrium quantities calculated in (2) can be rewritten in terms of the
asymmetry indices t + t and t - t . We have thati j i j
Without losing generality let us suppose that t > t . By the previous results, thisi j
B B
entails that we should have q < q but q > q . The exact size of the asymmetryi j i j
A A B B
in supplied quantities can be measured by substracting the right hand equations in
(9) from the left-hand ones. This gives
using (8). On the other hand, adding up the two columns in (9) yields the total
equilibrium quantities:
B
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(12)
The next proposition summarizes our new observations based upon the latter
computations.
PROPOSITION 5. The quantities delivered by each firm on markets A and B are
affected by both supply asymmetry and firm asymmetry in capabilities. However,
only firm asymmetry influences the firms' relative position on each market, whilst
only supply asymmetry influences total quantities. If there is no supply
asymmetry, then total quantities delivered on each market are the same.
The last term in expression (10) seems to suggest that market and
organizational conditions play a different role with respect to supplied quantities,
as opposed to what happens in the case of ex post capabilities. This assertion can
easily be qualified.
PROPOSITION 6. Market and organizational factors have the same qualitative
effect on the firms' relative market shares: that is, a more flexible organization
(lower ,) or a more elastic demand (lower b) will tend to increase firm asymmetry
in supplied quantities. However, ex ante firm asymmetry in capabilities is further
magnified in terms of relative market shares (R is large) if and only if b is low
compared to ,.
Finally, let us analyze asymmetry in firm profits. Starting with the above
computations, profit differences, noted B -B , can be expressed in terms of ex antei j
firm and industry asymmetries. After substitution in the profit functions of the
expressions for the endogenous variables and some algebra, we get
Interestingly, both kinds of asymmetry are found to matter for the existence of
differences in profits.
PROPOSITION 7. Ex ante firm asymmetry and industry asymmetry are each
separately necessary conditions for asymmetry in profits, and together they are
sufficient. Moreover, the larger these asymmetries, the larger the profit
differential.
Expression (12) also provides insights on who gets higher profits.
Without losing generality let us assume again that t > t . Whether B -B is positivei j i j
B B
or negative depends on whether b, is smaller or bigger than 4/3 and the industry is
biased towards market A or market B. The next proposition summarizes the
9findings.
PROPOSITION 8. Firm i makes more profit than firm j if either one of the
following conditions hold: (i) b, < 4/3 and t + t < 1 ; or (ii) b, > 4/3 and t +i j i
B B B
t > 1. The reverse is true under the following conditions: (iii) b, < 4/3 and t +j i
B B
t > 1 ; or (iv) b, > 4/3 and t + t < 1.j i j
B B B
This proposition has an intuitive rationale. Recall that, by assumption,
firm i is relatively more efficient ex ante than firm j to produce for market B, whilst
firm j is ex ante relatively more efficient on market A. If b, > 4/3, this situation is
maintained and magnified ex post by proposition 3. Therefore, if the industry as a
whole is ex ante more efficient serving market B - i.e. t + t > 1, then firm i whoi j
B B
is the most efficient of the two firms on this market makes higher profits; and
conversely, if t + t < 1, then firm j who is the most efficient one on market A getsi j
B B
a larger profit. If b, < 4/3, on the other hand, the situation is reversed ex post, and
firm i (resp. firm j) becomes relatively more efficient serving market A (resp.
market B) - i.e. t < t. By proposition 1, however, t + t < 1 (resp. < 1) entails thati j i j
B B
t + t < 1 (resp. > 1). Again, the most efficient firm on the larger market ( in termsi j
of supplied quantities) makes higher profits.
Regarding the impact of market and organizational characteristics on the
profit differential, let us consider the term n in (12). Clearly, this term gets closer
to 0 as the product b, decreases and approaches 8/9. The contribution of the two
factors b and , is asymmetric, however, and the latter has a stronger influence on
the difference B -B . The next statement highlights these facts.i j
PROPOSITION 9. A more competitive environment decreases the asymmetry in
profits. However, profit differences are greater if the organizational inertia
parameter , contributes relatively more to the product b, than the demand
parameter b.
III. WELFARE AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The previous section contains predictions on how ex ante asymmetries will
be magnified ex post. We will now study the consequences of ex post asymmetries
on consumer welfare and derive the optimal amount of such asymmetries that
should prevail. These are matters of interest for at least two important chapters of
public policy - competition policy and industrial policy. The present model allows
a convenient distinction to be made between these. Competition policy seeks to
prevent monopoly practices that can be detrimental to consumers; it can be viewed
as regulating firm asymmetries. Industrial policy, on the other hand, focuses on a
nation's industrial capabilities; it seems to be concerned, rather, with supply
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asymmetries.
A. Prices and Welfare
From (11) and proposition (5), it can be predicted that the equilibrium
price on each market will not depend on firm asymmetry but only on supply
asymmetry. Indeed, after substitution in the inverse demand functions of the
expressions for total quantities in (11), we get
Note in particular that, according to proposition 1, t + t = 1 implies that t + t =i j i j
B B
1, so p = p = (a+1)/3. This result is stated as a proposition.A B
PROPOSITION 10. If there is no supply asymmetry ex ante, then prices remain
equal and constant.
The result that prices are affected only by supply asymmetry bears
interesting conclusions for competition policy. The usual relationship between
concentration and consumer welfare does not hold here: since increased asymmetry
between firms does not affect prices, consumer surplus may not be affected even
though market shares shift and concentration in each market increases. The
intuition for this result goes as follows. As firm asymmetry increases, more market
share is taken by a given firm on a given market, which increases each firm's market
power on the market it dominates. But total industry costs are also reduced, for it
is the most efficient firm serving a market who gets to dominate this market. In the
present model, cost reduction compensates for greater market concentration to leave
prices and consumer surplus unchanged.
B. Optimal Supply Asymmetry
We will now investigate which level of industry capabilities t + t wouldi j
be chosen by a benevolent social planner. The social planner's objective in the
actual context would be to maximize the sum of the consumer surplus and firm i and
j's profits, that is:
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Note that this condition is also sufficient by the initial assumption that b, > 8/9.8
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(14)
(15)
(16)
For simplicity, let's assume that the planner can control supply asymmetry without
affecting firm asymmetry. After some algebra the first-order necessary condition
reduces to8
This gives the socially desirable level of supply asymmetry in relation with the
exogenous parameters:
This level is similar to the one that is predicted in equation (6) and proposition 1.
Hence, we have:
PROPOSITION 11. For a given index of firm asymmetry t - t , the level of supplyi j
asymmetry that emerges ex post is socially optimal.
If one accepts the definition of industrial policy proposed above - i.e.
public policy that regulates the sum t + t , this result can be seen as yet anotheri j
argument against setting up such a policy. This interpretation needs to be qualified,
of course, because the present model assumes a peculiar industry structure - a
duopoly with two markets - and does not incorporate international trade.
Proposition 11 shows nevertheless that an industrial policy that intervenes on
industry capabilities may not contribute to enhance social welfare.
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(17)
(18)
C. Optimal Firm Asymmetry
We now consider optimal firm asymmetry in capabilities, assuming that
supply asymmetry remains constant throughout. Propositions 5 and 10 above state
that total quantities and market prices are unaffected by firm asymmetry. Hence,
welfare maximization with respect to firm asymmetry reduces to minimizing total
costs given by the last two terms of (14). The first-order conditions for this problem
can then be written as
after some algebra. Note that the second-order derivative is positive, so the total
cost function to be minimized is concave, when b, < 2. In this case the social
planner's preferred level of firm asymmetry is then a corner solution where t - t =i j
±1, which means maximum firm asymmetry. However, when b, > 8/9, the
duopolistic outcome could be an interior solution. This entails that ex post firm
asymmetry may not be optimal when 8/9 < b, < 2. On the other hand, if b, > 2,
the social planner's problem can have an interior solution that is determined by
equation (17) and is given by
Note that the coefficient D is larger that the coefficient D defined in (8), so that the*
social planner would again prefer more firm asymmetry than what naturally
emerges. We therefore have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 12. For a given index of supply asymmetry, ex post firm
asymmetry is not optimal when capability indices are strictly between 0 and 1.
Qualitatively, however, the social planner's choice of capabilities is similar to that
of the duopoly.
This proposition finally implies that it would be in the firms' collective interest to
increase firm asymmetry by more than the duopoly outcome: that is, a monopoly
would choose more asymmetry.
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied the causes of industry heterogeneity with the help of an
integrative yet simple model. We thereby tried to shed some light on the current
debate between industrial organization and management strategy scholars as to
which type of factors - market or organizational respectively - are most important
for explaining heterogeneity. Our model is a first step in this direction. One
valuable extension would be to include some of the causes of organizational inertia
(e.g., long-term contracts, influence costs, etc.) and endogenize partly in the analysis
the extent to which an organization can resist to change. Such an exercise might
lead to a finer description of organizational capabilities that would fit some of the
peculiar facts provided by industry studies and case studies. Another interesting
extension would also be to study a repeated version of the present game and
consider some of the dynamic issues raised in evolutionary economics (Nelson and
Sidney G. Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1994). In this context, one would need a more
detailed description of organizational capabilities that is consistent with the notion
of routines; it would also be necessary, and valuable, to make the number of firms
in the industry endogenous.
We also tried in this paper to derive results that have empirical content.
Recent industry studies, such as those by Karel O. Cool and Schendel (1987) and
Catherine Matraves (1996) on the pharmaceutical industry, reveal that different
firms lead in different markets, and that concentration in a specific product market
can be high. Ex ante asymmetry in the firms' respective capabilities is often
invoked to explain this outcome: firms have specialized in delivering products for
which they had an initial cost advantage. This fact seems consistent with our
propositions 3 and 5. Furthermore, overall industry shares and profits of the
leading firms in the pharmaceutical industry seem not to have differed much in
recent years, whilst overall industry capabilities appear not to have evolve
significantly during the same period. This observation also seems consistent with
some of our results (namely proposition 7). This is, however, casual empiricism.
To rigorously confront the theoretical findings of this paper with the data is an
immediate and important challenge for future research.
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